in the social setting that are external and proximate to the offender. The early classical school of criminology, for example, attributed crime to the nexus of costs and benefits of offending.
Economic theories of crime (Becker 1967) have elaborated this line of argument, and early social control/social learning theories brought nonlegal costs and benefits explicitly into considerations of the causes of crime (Toby 1957; Briar & Piliavin 1965; Reckless 1967; Hirschi 1969; Akers 1973) .
On the surface, recent developments in criminological theory appear to sustain this trend of two separate theoretical tracks. The work of routine activities and lifestyle theorists such as Hindelang (Hindelang et al. 1978) , Cohen & Felson (Cohen & Felson 1979; Cohen et al. 1980 Cohen et al. , 1981 Cohen & Land 1987; Maxfield 1987 ) and of rational choice theorists (Piliavin et al. 1986; Cornish & Clarke 1986; Clarke & Cornish 1985) focus on the role of situational factors and the perceived costs and benefits of crime as determinants of target selection and more broadly of the decision whether to offend. In contrast, work by Wilson and Herrnstein (1985) and Gottfredson and Hirschi (1991) continues the tradition of attributing persistent criminal offending to enduring differences in criminal propensity among persons; their work, however, radically departs from early "type of person" theories. While underappreciated, both sets of authors also incorporate key assumptions of rational choice theories.
We report here on an empirical study that combines considerations of stable criminal propensity with concepts that are central to utilitarian and social control theories of crime the perceived costs and benefits of crime and the objective characteristics of an offending opportunity. We find substantial evidence that "lack of self-control," the central construct of the Gottfredson-Hirschi theory and implicitly of the Wilson-Herrnstein theory has a positive and highly significant association with intentions to commit several different types of crime. We also find that the perceived benefits and costs of crime have a comparably large impact on intentions. The latter finding supports the arguments of Sampson and Laub (1990 , 1993 that the strength of social bonds materially influences propensity to engage in crime independent of enduring individual dif- ing individual differences in criminal propensity. l Routine activities/lifestyle theories (Hindelang et al. 1978; Cohen & Felson 1979; Cohen et al. 1980 Cohen et al. , 1981 Cohen & Land 1987; Maxfield 1987) are not theories of offending per se; rather they are theories of victimization risk. Notwithstanding, they have obvious implications for theories of offending (Hough 1987; Riley 1987; Tuck & Riley 1986) . These theories, which presume a supply of motivated offenders, examine the effect of situational obstacles and attractions on their target selection. As such, routine activity/lifestyle theories focus on situational characteristics that vary across offense opportunities not offenders.2
The rational choice perspective shares the routine activity/ lifestyle theory focus on situational inducements and impediments to offending but also places at least as much emphasis on would-be offenders' subjective estimates of expected rewards and costs (Cornish & Clarke 1986 . From the rational choice perspective, costs and benefits of crime are not enduring characteristics of persons but vary from one potential crime situation to another, and comprise what Cornish and Clarke (1987:935) describe as the "choice-structuring properties" of offenses.
In sum, what is common to both the routine activities and rational choice theories is an inattention, in both the theoretical and empirical literature, to the possibility that persons may differ with respect to their initial propensity to offend. Theoretical writings provide virtually no discussion of time-stable individual variation in the motivation to offend, and empirical models fail to incorporate criminal propensity as one of their exogenous variables.3
Theories of Enduring Individual Differences
Early in their influential text, Wilson and Herrnstein (1985:25) make clear that the central theme of their theory of crime and human nature is enduring individual differences in 1 Considerations of expected utility and rational choice have a long tradition in deterrence theory (see the articles in Cornish & Clarke 1986; Piliavin et al. 1986; Paternoster 1989; Grasmick & Bursik 1990) . When referring to rational choice theory, then, we mean rational choice/deterrence theory.
2 Another situational factor that affects criminal offending is the exposure of the crime target. Felson & Cohen 1981 define exposure as the accessibility or availability of potential victims to potential offenders. In our hypothetical scenarios, described below, the crime target and offender are brought together, making exposure nonproblematic.
For this reason, we focus on what Cohen and Felson refer to as target attractiveness and guardianship.
3 In fairness to routine activities/lifestyle theorists, the issue of enduring differences among would-be offenders is of only tangential relevance to the objective of their theories-explaining victimization. Our point, however, is that if such theories are recast as theories of target selection, the issue of enduring individual differences in criminal propensity is no longer tangential. Space does not permit a lengthy response to this fundamental challenge, but we attempt a brief exposition of our argument. In an ongoing stream of research, Sampson and Laub (1990 , 1993 In the analysis that follows, we provide an empirical test of a model that includes considerations of persistent individual differences in criminal offending, the situational elements of target vulnerability and attractiveness, and external and internal social control variables.
Methods
The Scenario Method
Data were assembled using a survey that presents respondents with a scenario describing in detail the conditions under which a crime is committed. Selected scenario conditions (described below) were experimentally varied across persons. Respondents were asked to estimate the probability that they would commit the act specified in the scenario, the chance that their commission of the offense would result in arrest and in exposure without arrest, and questions designed to measure their perceptions of the costs and benefits of committing the offense described in the scenario. 4 The survey also included a battery of questions to measure the extent of respondents' selfcontrol.
The scenario method differs from conventional data collection approaches in perceptual deterrence research in only one important respect. Instead of using self-reports of one's own criminal involvement or alternatively self-reports of future criminal intentions as the response variable, the scenario method uses offending scenarios to elicit the response variable.
The principal weakness of this approach is that an expressed intention to offend is not synonymous with actual performance. Fishbein and Ajzen (1975:36841) , however, argue that under appropriate conditions, "there should be a high relation between a person's intention to perform a particular behavior and his actual performance of that behavior." They specify those conditions as (1) the degree to which the intention to behave is measured with the same specificity as the behavior that is being predicted, (2) the stability of the expressed 4 The strategy of using respondents' self-reported intention to offend, as opposed to self-reports of actual behavior, has been used successfully in much recent deterrence research (Grasmick et al. 1984; Tittle 1980; Murray & Erickson 1987; Klepper & Nagin, 1989a , 1989b Bachman et al. 1992) . Of these cited studies, however, only
Klepper and Nagin and Bachman et al. use the scenario method as described below.
The use of behavioral intentions also has a rich and productive history in psychology (see Fishbein & Ajzen 1975) . For example, elicitation of projected behavior has been extensively used by scholars of decisionmaking under uncertainty (Kahneman et al. 1982; Nisbett & Ross 1980 (3) the degree to which the individual is able to willfully carry out the intention.
With these three criteria in mind we have attempted to construct the scenarios to maximize the correspondence between intention and actual behavior. Intentions to offend are measured under very specific conditions. Given the specificity of the scenarios and the fact that they involve situations that are not foreign to our respondents, there is no compelling reason to suspect instability in the expressed intentions. Finally, the behaviors in question are under the general volitional control of the respondents, and we measure the important impediments to behavior (e.g., moral inhibitions, social attachments, perceived opportunity).
Notwithstanding our efforts to maximize the link between intention and actual behavior, we acknowledge that this link is still problematic. In ourjudgment, however, certain advantages of the scenario method outweigh this weakness. These strengths stem from the specificity of the scenarios. (Klepper & Nagin 1989a , 1989b Grasmick & Bursik 1990) . With scenario data, however, we are able to estimate what Grasmick and Bursik refer to as an "instantaneous" relationship between independent variables and self-reported intentions to offend.
The scenario methodology is a hybrid. It combines the use of hypothetical scenarios that provide respondents with a specific and detailed offense situation with traditional survey questions. We believe this hybrid approach is superior to past data collection methods used in perceptual deterrence research.
The scenarios allow us to provide a specific situation to serve as a reference point for our inquiry into the perceived costs and While we acknowledge some element of truth to these criticisms, there are two reasons why we believe they pose less compelling arguments for the purposes of this study.
First, it should be understood that a sample of respondents from a large public university is likely to contain a moderate It might be argued that there may be some bias in our selection of introductory criminology courses since criminology students may respond to crime scenarios differently, and they may have some knowledge of deterrence from their course work. There are a number of reasons allaying our own concerns about this. First, according to the instructors' registration roles, fewer than 50So of the students enrolled in these classes were criminology majors. These criminology courses meet general university requirements for a social science course. As a result, about half of our respondents came from majors throughout the university (engineering, business, humanities, mathematics).
Second, these were introductory courses with no prerequisite but were prerequisites for other, advanced criminology courses. It is quite unlikely, therefore, that any student had previously taken a criminology course before. Third, questionnaires were administered during the first week of classes before any lectures. There was no opportunity, therefore, for students to learn about deterrence or the criminal justice system. Fourth, class standing was unrelated to any of the outcome variables. Kanin and Parcell (1977) reported that nearly one-half of university women were victims of some form of unwanted sexual contact. In a recent survey involving 32 colleges and universities, Koss and her colleagues found that about one-third of university women were the victims of sexual aggression and this victimization most often came at the hands of a fellow student (Koss 1983; Koss & Oros 1982; ; see also Bourque 1989; Sanday 1990; Ward et al. 1991; Warshaw & Koss 1988) . Collectively, this information leads to the conclusion that college students are frequent offenders in situations involving theft, drunk driving, and sexual assault.
Second, the kinds of research questions we are interested in ideally call for samples with a large proportion of marginal offenders. These marginal offenders are not persons whose selfcontrol is so low that they would be unaffected by the delayed consequences of crime. For these more marginal offenders the commission of an offense is a matter of calculation and deliberation in which delayed consequences are of greater importance. Crime is neither precluded by strong compunctions nor is it compelled by strong motivation. This reason too makes a college sample particularly attractive.
Scenario Design
Respondents were presented with three scenarios, each involving a different offense: drunk driving, larceny, and sexual assault (males only). All were framed in settings familiar to our college student respondents.
6 Further, a Bureau ofJustice Statistics Report (Cohen 1992) reveals that the rate of arrest for driving while under the influence (DUI) is highest for those between the ages of 21 and 24. Those in the 18-20 age range had the second highest arrest rate for DUI. The college years (1a24), then, are a prime time for driving while drunk.
7 The survey of Maryland students revealed that in a 12-month period nearly lOSo of the sample reported being taken advantage of sexually while they had been drinking and an additional lOSo reported that they had taken sexual advantage of another while drinking. Comparable scenarios were created for theft and sexual as-
sault. An example of each is provided in Appendix A. For female students scenario characters were women; otherwise the scenarios were identical across genders.
The scenarios were extensively pretested and reworked to insure their credibility with apparently good succe.ss. Across scenario types, from 95So to 99So of respondents reported that the vignette was "believable and realistic."
Measurement of Variables
Separate models were estimated for each scenario crime type. The dependent variable is the respondent's estimate of the probability they would do what the scenario character did.
Responses were measured on a scale from 0 (no chance at all) to 10 (lOOSo chance).
We next describe the independent variables included in the model:
Lack of Self-Control
Wilson and Herrnstein and Gottfredson and Hirschi are in general agreement on the distinguishing characteristics of chronic offenders. To be sure, they pointedly disagree on the cause of relevant individual differences, but this fundamental disagreement is not relevant for our purposes.8 We thus use the label "lack of self-control" to reference the common cluster of personal characteristics that both sets of authors agree predispose individuals to crime.
In their discussion of the concept, Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990:89-90 "concrete 'here and now' orientation" (impulsiveness), "lack diligence, tenacity, or persistence in a course of action" (desire for simple tasks), are "adventuresome, active, and physical"
(preference for both risk and physical activity), are "indifferent, or insensitive to the suffering and needs of others" (self-centered), and "tend to have minimal tolerance for frustration and little ability to respond to conflict through verbal rather than physical means" (quick temper).
Our measure of self-control comes from a 24-item instrument devised by Grasmick et al. (1993) . This instrument is intended to measure the six elements of self-control discussed above; impulsiveness, desire for simple tasks, risk preference, preference for physical activity, self-centeredness, and temper. for the sixth), as was the amount of variance explained by each (10So for the second, 5So for the sixth). Following the Scree Test (Nunnally 1967) , the greatest break between consecutive eigenvalues was between the first and second factor extracted, suggesting the appropriateness of a one-factor model. The factor loadings from this analysis were very comparable to those reported by Grasmick et al. (1993) , as was the scale's reliability (Cronbach's alpha=.83).
We acknowledge that some might view the results of the factor analysis as suggesting that the self-control scale is multidimensional. Our purpose here, however, is not to untie the different dimensions of self-control, so the issue of the uni-or multidimensionality of self-control is not central to our work. We do believe, however, that we have found plausible evidence for the unidimensionality of the 24 items, and have, therefore, constructed a composite scale. Additional research on the psychometric properties of this scale and the utility of other self-control scales is needed. For example, in the drinking and driving scenario, four specific conditions were manipulated: (1) the distance traveled between the bar and George's home (ten miles or one mile), (2) the type of road George had to travel to get home (heavily traveled and patrolled Route 1 or back roads), (3) the inconvenience to George of returning to retrieve his car at the bar the next day (George's roommate was home and could take him or he had to catch a bus or walk), and (4) the vigilance of law enforcement (there was reduced surveillance because of state police budget cutbacks or a state police "crackdown" on drinking and driving).ll Both routine activities and rational choice theory predict that these conditions would affect intentions either directly (e.g., convenience) or indirectly via risk perceptions (e.g., law enforcement vigilance). Table 1 reports the manipulated conditions for each of the three scenarios.
Perceived UtilitCosts and Benefits
Rational choice theorists have argued that the decision to commit an offense is negatively related to the perceived costs of crime and positively related to the perceived rewards of crime. We measured both dimensions of subjective utility in this research.
Our index of the perceived costs is constructed to capture theoretical arguments advanced by Williams and Hawkins (1986) . Based on an appeal to ideas central to social control theory, they argue that such costs are triggered by others "discovering" the deviant behavior. Such discovery can result from arrest but can also occur even if the individual is not arrested.
The offender may be exposed without arrest if the victim reports it to others but not to the police or if the offense is observed by others but not reported to the police. Respondents were thus asked to estimate the chances of arrest (Pa discovery by arrest) and the chances of exposure without arrest (Pe discovery by exposure).
To measure perceptions of the consequences of discovery by arrest and by exposure through informal social networks, respondents were asked to estimate the conditional probability that discovery by each of these two mechanisms would result in dismissal from the university (Pd/as Pd/e) lost respect of close friends (Pfr/as P fr/e)s lost respect of family (Pfa/as P fa/e)s and diminished job prospects j/a, Pi/e) Each of these conditional probabilities measures the risk conditional on discovery of and were asked to talk about how realistic each was, and what factors would influence their decision to commit the offense. The results from these focus group discussions led us to select the particular situational elements contained in the scenarios and also influenced the design of the base scenario.
1l The reduced surveillance condition was not contrived; due to state budget problems, such cutbacks were in fact occurring at the time the survey was administered. Even highly certain sanctions cannot be expected to affect decisions to offend unless they are also perceived to entail some cost (Andenaes 1974; Bailey & Lott 1975; Grasmick & Bryjak 1980; Grasmick & Bursik 1990 ). Thus, we asked respondents to estimate the perceived severity of each sanction. Using a measure much like one Grasmick and colleagues employed in their research, we asked each person to estimate "how much of a problem" each sanction would pose for them. Response options ranged on an l l-point continuum from "no problem at all" (coded 0) to "a very big problem" (coded 10). To create a sanction measure that reflected both the risk and cost of perceived punishment, we multiplied each certainty measure by its * j corresponc 1ng seversty component.
In this research we are less interested in disentangling the independent effects of these different types of punishment than we are in considering the more general role of sanction threats themselves.l3 For this reason, a composite measure total sanctions was created by summing responses across each of the individual sanction threat items.l4
In addition to the fear of externally imposed sanctions, tests of the rational choice perspective have recently included considerations of internally imposed punishments (Williams & Hawkins 1986; Grasmick & Bursik 1990; Grasmick et al. 1993 ). Grasmick and Bursik (1990) argue that persons who have internalized a moral prohibition against a particular deviant act contemplate the possibility and cost of guilt or shame for doing that act. These feelings of guilt the "pangs of conscience" (Braithwaite 1989:74) are experienced as "painful emotions" (ScheS 1988:396) and constitute another cost of crime.l5
13 Also, the large (positive) correlations across the specific types of sanctions generally makes it impossible to disentangle their independent effects.
14 The index of total sanctions (TS) was created by the following composite in- For these reasons, we included a measure of shame in the model that is constructed along the lines suggested by Grasmick and Bursik (1990) . They argue that shame is a binary event; one either experiences it or not. Respondents were thus asked whether they would feel guilt or shame if they were discovered (either by arrest or exposure without arrest) committing the offense described in the scenario (yes/no). While the event of shame is assumed to be binary, the quantity or painfulness of the "pang" might very well vary across persons. To capture the intensity of guilt, respondents were asked to estimate how much of a problem guilt/shame would be for them if they were to commit the act in question. The shame index was constructed by multiplying the binary indicators of shame with the intensity of shame.
With a few exceptions (Carroll 1978; Tittle 1980; Scott & Grasmick 1981; Piliavin et al. 1986; Klepper & Nagin 1989a , 1989b , empirical tests of rational choice hypotheses have examined the cost but not the benefit dimension of offending.
Available research generally finds that the perceived benefits of criminal offending are important considerations in would-be offenders' scheme of calculation and perhaps more important than the estimated costs (Carroll 1978; Piliavin et al. 1986 ).
Any utility-based model of criminal offending that only includes the costs dimension is, thus, incompletely specified. A measure of the perceived pleasure of each scenario behavior was obtained by asking respondents to report "how much fun or a kick" it would be if they were to commit the offense under the scenario conditions. Response options varied on an l l-point continuum from 0 ("no fun or kick at all") to 10 ("a great deal of fun or kick").
In addition to the exogenous variables discussed above, two other variables were included in the model specification, gendF 16 andprzor offending 17 (number of times in the past year they had driven a car while drunk, stolen or shoplifted something, and used violence against another person for, respectively, the drunk driving, theft, and sexual assault model specifications).
16 Since the sexual assault analysis involved only males, gender was excluded from this model. In the other models, gender is coded 0 for females and 1 for males.
17 Stability in criminal offending over time may be due to persistent individual differences in some personality trait, such as self-control, or to some stable characteristic of a person's social environment, such as social class or neighborhood levels of crime. Our measure of self-control is designed to capture only the first of these reasons for persistent involvement in crime. Prior behavior is included to capture the influence of other sources of stable criminality. Nonetheless, prior offending may be viewed as still another indicator of lack of self-control. We note, however, that the results reported below are unaffected by the inclusion of prior offending in the specification.
Thus, for the purposes of this study its interpretation is moot. The modal response category of the dependent variable was zero; 635to of the respondents reported that there was "no chance" that they would commit the specified theft, 335to reported "no chance" of drinking and driving under the scenario conditions, and 855to reported no chance of committing the specified sexual assault. Because the outcome variables are heavily censored at zero, the models were estimated using tobit regression. The results are reported in Table 2 . (n) (643) (661) (365) a The theft scenario involved only three manipulated conditions (see lable 1).
b Only males are involved in this analysis.
ries. Persons low in self-control perceive the rewards of crime as more valuable and the costs of crime as less aversive, are less likely to feel the "pangs of conscience," and are more likely to report that they would commit crimes than those with more self-control.
Because the data are not longitudinal, however, we cannot test another important hypothesis, whether lack of self-control is time stable. Indirect evidence, however, suggests that it is.
We regressed self-control on respondent self-reports of prior drunk driving, theft, and violence. In all three cases, the association was positive and highly significant, which indicates that current self-control is related to past behavior. We appreciate, of course, that this analysis does not resolve the issue of direction of causality, but the positive association is consistent with stability.
Both theories, as well as routine activity/rational choice theory, also predict that immediate characteristics of the criminal opportunity are choice relevant. Few of the manipulated scenario conditions had a significant direct effect on respondents' intentions to offend. None of the situational factors in the theft scenario were related to such intentions, and three out of four conditions in the drinking and driving and sexual as- shame, is consistent with other recent deterrence and rational choice research (Klepper & Nagin 1989a , 1989b Nagin & Paternoster 1991; Grasmick & Bursik 1990 ).
Further, the magnitudes of the associations of rewards and costs with intentions are quite large. Table 3 reports estimates of the percentage change in the dependent variable associated with a standard deviation increase in the specified independent 20 The effect of shame on intentions to commit sexual assault was in the expected theoretical direction but not statistically significant (t=-1.313). It may be that shame had no effect on sexual assault because this offense only concerns males, and shame is more effective in inhibiting the conduct of females. Such was not the case, however.
Separate analyses by gender were conducted on theft and drinking and driving. Shame had a significant inverse effect on intentions to drink and drive for females, but a nonsignificant effect for theft. For males, shame had a significant effect on both theft and drinking and driving. for drinking and driving, and 405to for sexual assault. The corresponding changes for shame are, respectively, -185to, -18%o, and-20%o. A 1 standard deviation increase in perceived pleasure increases intentions 675to for theft, 23So for drinking and driving, and 55%o for sexual assault.22 These changes are of comparable magnitude to those associated with self-control (395to, 175to, and 835to, respectively).
The lesson we deduce from Tables 2 and 3 is that while poor self-control plays a major role in explaining variation in intentions to offend, it is by no means the sole determinant of such intentions. Perceived risks and rewards play comparably important roles. In our judgment this is noteworthy because two of these variables, total sanctions and shame, are classical social control variables. 23 We interpret this evidence as indicating that independent of lack of self-control conventionally postulated mechanisms of social control are operating.
We acknowledge, however, that there are other interpreta-21 Unlike the coefficients of a least squares regression model, the coefficients of a tobit model cannot be directly used to compute magnitudes; the coefficient does not equal the change in the response variable associated with a l-unit change in the coefficient's associated independent variable. The calculations reported in Table 3 were based on the following formula for computing the expected value of the response variable, E(y), for given values of the exogenous variables, x:
where o is a vector of estimated tobit coefficients, a is the estimated standard deviation of the error term, (, and +(*) and zP(*) are, respectively, the standardized cumulative normal distribution function and the standardized normal density function.
22 The substantial association of perceived pleasure with intentions is not surprising, but we note that the two variables are not synonymous. In the rational choice framework, would-be offenders are assumed to balance the perceived benefits and costs of offending. Thus, a basic prediction of this framework is that an individual will not engage in an a criminal act unless he or she perceives the act itself as producing benefits. To do otherwise would be irrational; the individual would risk punishment for no perceived gain. It does not follow, however, that just because the act is perceived as pleasurable the individual will necessarily commit it. If perceived risks outweigh perceived pleasures, the individual will be deterred.
23 The model also includes two variables, prior offending and gender, that are not central to the investigation. They were merely included as "control" variables.
As expected, prior offending had a positive and significant association with intentions. Gottfredson and Hirschi argue that the positive association of past and future criminal involvement is a reflection of the time stability of lack of self-control. We note, however, that controlling for lack of self-control, prior behavior continues to have a highly significant positive relationship with intentions. While the magnitude of this association is mitigated modestly by the self-control index, it remains very large.
Our results concerning the gender effect are interesting and in some respects sur- Drinking and driving:
Self-control 1 7.4
Total sanctions -21.9
Perceived pleasure 23.2
Shame -17.9
Sexual assault:
Self-control 82.6
Total sanctions -40.1
Perceived pleasure 55.5
Shame -20.1 tions of the results. One is that responses to the survey items used to measure the social control variables may be a causal consequence of the intentions variable rather than the reverse.
In an attempt to maintain internal consistency, respondents reporting a high (low) likelihood of engaging in the scenario act may have reported less (more) negative social repercussions.
The fact that the randomly assigned scenario characteristics had little influence on reported intentions may give further credence to this interpretation.
While we cannot rule out this interpretation, we are skeptical of its plausibility. First, many of the experimental manipulations were designed to influence intentions indirectly through their impact on risk perceptions and subjective utility. As previously reported we did find more substantial evidence of scenario conditions affecting both these variables. Second, rank orderings of average responses across scenario crime types conform with research findings (Sellin & Wolfgang 1978; Rossi et al. 1974 ) that sexual assault is viewed as a more serious crime than drunk driving and larceny and that larceny, in turn, is a more serious crime than drunk driving. tions is an artifact of measurement error in the latent construct lack of self-control. This interpretation harks back to our earlier discussion of the argument that strong social bonds are simply another manifestation of self-control and have no independent effect on the decision to offend. Because our index of self-control is an inexact measurement of the latent construct, the negative and significant associations of the social control variables with intentions are conceivably only a manifestation of the measurement error in self-control. Stated differently, the social control variables may be capturing the influence of that part of the latent construct, lack of self-control, that is not measured by our index of self-control.
We acknowledge that it is likely that to some extent the associations of the social control variables with intentions are inflated due to measurement error of the latent construct but we are skeptical that the associations are entirely or even predominately attributable to such error. Earlier we discussed the Sampson and Laub (1990 , 1993 Our research has found evidence in support of both traditions. Intentions to engage in three very distinctive offensesdrunk driving, theft, and sexual assault are positively and very significantly related to lack of self-control. This relationship holds and remains sizable in magnitude even after prior behavior, situational characteristics of the offense, and the perceived rewards and costs of offending were controlled. We also found that self-control is indirectly related to intentions to offend through its influence on choice-relevant variables such as total sanctions, perceived utility, and shame. The findings support the conclusions of Farrington (1992a, 1989b) and Sampson and Laub (1990 , 1993 ) that criminological theory must include stable individual differences in propensity to offend as a central construct.
We also found substantial evidence in support of the tradi- Importantly, we also found that a variable often omitted from previous deterrence/rational choice research the perceived pleasure of offending-was significantly related to the expressed intention to offend. Moreover, the anticipated reward of offending generally had a greater impact on intentions than the perceived costs (Carroll 1978; Piliavin et al. 1986 In the end, we do not believe that the two criminological traditions examined here should be viewed as competing explanations. Therefore, evidence in support of one theory should not be viewed as evidence in refutation of the other. Quite the contrary, we think that our empirical findings suggest that both must be included in a complete understanding of crime. We close by briefly outlining an approach to unify the two theoretical perspectives.
A belief that variation in offending is reflective of variations in criminal propensity or poor self-control does not preclude the possibility that would-be offenders are sensitive to the attractions and deterrents of crime. As already emphasized, Stated differently, those with low self-control find it difficult to invest in conventionality because they discount future rewards in favor of immediate pleasures. Since they have fewer investments in the future, persons with low self-control have much less at risk than those with greater self-control. We believe that the reason persons with poor self-control commit crimes at a consistently higher rate than others is because they have less to lose.
In the language of labor economics, because of their present-orientation those with poor self-control have a high discount rate. Since they place less value on future consumption, they are unlikely to invest in a line of activity that sacrifices immediate for future gratification. Those with high discount rates, been drinking heavily at the party, and they are quite drunk. After they get to Susan's apartment, where she lives alone, they sit down on the couch and begin to listen to music. In a few moments Josh attempts to kiss and fondle Susan. She allowsJosh to kiss and fondle her for several minutes. WhenJosh attempts to remove her clothes Susan says that she is not interested in having sex and tries to get off the couch. Josh then pins Susan to the couch so she cannot get up. He takes off her clothes and has sexual intercourse with her.
Josh then leaves Susan's apartment.
Theft Scenario
Bill is a college sophmore and lives in the dorms. Bill wakes up and decides to take a shower. He goes to the shower room which consists of about a half dozen shower stalls and a separate changing room. It's about 8:00 A.M.
On a Monday morning and a lot of people are up and about. He observes that three people are showering whom he does not recognize. As he starts to undress, Bill observes a $20 bill sticking out of the pocket of someone's jacket.
He takes the $20 and leaves immediately.
